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I. INTRODUCTION

It is a well-established fact that the international antiquities
market is responsible for the destruction and vandalism of
archaeological and cultural sites worldwide.' Material removed from
these sites is traded across jurisdictions until it can be sold legally
and acquired as "art" by private and institutional collectors in North
America, Europe and, increasingly, East Asia. 2 One consequence of
this trade is that most countries outside the United States have now
passed laws that protect archaeological heritage by proscribing the
unauthorized excavation of antiquities, the export of antiquities, or
both. 3 Opinions are divided, however, as to the effectiveness and

* McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, Downing Street, Cambridge
CB2 3ER United Kingdom
See e.g., ROGER ATWOOD, STEALING HISTORY: TOMB RAIDERS, SMUGGLERS,
1.
AND THE LOOTING OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 11, 241 (2004); NEIL J. BRODIE ET AL.,
STEALING HISTORY: THE ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL MATERIAL 8 (2000); PATRICK J.
O'KEEFE, TRADE IN ANTIQUITIES: REDUCING DESTRUCTION AND THEFT 14-16 (1997).
BRODIE ETAL., supra note 1, at 33.
2.
3.
See 3 LYNDEL V. PROTT & PATRICK J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL
HERITAGE: MOVEMENT 429-530 (1989).
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even the desirability of such strong regulations at the source of the
4
artifacts.
Opponents of such regulation argue that the prohibitions deter
people from declaring antiquities that are discovered by chance. They
further argue that because of the prohibition, information about the
place of finding and context of the objects is often lost, and that any
underground, increasing the
is driven
subsequent trade
criminalization and corruption concomitant with such regulation. 5
Opponents also contend that these laws should protect only the most
important archaeological finds while allowing the remainder to
circulate freely. 6 The free circulation of these duplicate or poorer
quality pieces, which might result from museum storage and fresh
excavations, would go some way towards satisfying demand. They
further argue that free circulation has the added cultural and
educational benefit of allowing a large number of people to come into
contact with ancient "art," either as owners or as museum visitors.
Proponents of strong regulation at the source of the artifacts
counter that archaeological sites are a finite resource such that, in
the long term, there can be no strategy of legal and sustainable
commercial exploitation. 7 They argue instead that laws regulating
the free flow of archaeological material constrain the market, through
either a direct deterrent effect or the potentially high cost of
circumvention, and therefore help to protect the integrity of
8
archaeological sites at the source of the artifacts.
These two contrasting views on how best to regulate the market
reveal a fundamental disagreement over the source of traded
antiquities. Opponents of strong regulation adhere to the premise
that most archaeological objects coming onto the market are chance
finds. 9 Chance finds are objects that would be found anyway as an
incident of building or agricultural operations but, in the absence of a
market, would be thrown away or destroyed. In effect, the market
rescues them. Proponents are not convinced about chance finds; they
believe that most material new to the market has been deliberately
looted and that, without the market, it would remain safely
unexcavated. 10
Both parties to this debate make simplifying assumptions, and
there is a noticeable absence of evidentiary support. For example, in
2000, the American Association of Museums (AAM) claimed that
"blind enforcement of restrictive patrimony laws is not the answer" to

4.

BRODIE ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See id.
See id.
See 3 PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 3, at 464-70.
See id.
S. White, A Collector's Odyssey, 7 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 171-72 (1998).
See 3 PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 3, at 12.

20051

PERSPECTIVES ON THE REGULA TION OF TRADE

1053

archaeological looting, because "experience shows that given the
unabated demand for antiquities, restrictive cultural property
regimes merely promote a black market, shifting the trade from
legitimate to illegitimate channels and increasing the risks posed by
clandestine looting by driving all trade underground."" But the AAM
gave no factual support for this statement, relying upon the authority
of another similar statement made by John H. Merryman that,
[rletention laws . . . merely ensure that the export trade moves
underground, putting cultural property traffic in the hands of the
wrong people, who will do it the wrong way. Historically, the tighter
the export control in the source nation, the stronger the pressure to
form an illicit market. 12
13
Merryman himself relied upon yet a further authority, Paul Bator.
Bator sets out the microeconomic and psychological reasons why
strong regulation should fail, but gives no hard evidence, aside from
his explanation that the large volume of illegally exported material
reaching the international market itself demonstrated that strong
export control regimes had failed. 14 He seems not to have considered
15
that, without such controls, the situation may have been far worse.
In theory, the study of regulatory responses to other illegal
trades, particularly those in narcotics and natural resources, should
offer instructive insights into the use of regulation against the
antiquities trade. There is no broad measure, however, of agreement
as to the effectiveness of these regulatory responses, which seems
often to depend upon the particular social and cultural circumstances
of the trade in question. 16 It is not surprising that the effect of
regulation depends upon factors that are not always legal or
economic, and it emphasizes the danger in considering all illegal

Brief for Am. Assoc. of Museums et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Michael
11.
H. Steinhardt, United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. July
12, 1999) (No. 97-6319).
Id.
12.

13.

See, John H. Merryman, A Licit InternationalTrade In Cultural Objects, in

5 LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 13 (Martine Briat & Judith A.
Freedberg eds., 1996).
14.

PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ART 41-43 (Univ. of

Chicago Press ed. 1983).
It can be argued that if more material is released to the market to
15.
ameliorate demand, then dealers will develop strategies to promote the new material
and create more demand, so that the ameliorating effect is lost. See Neil Brodie, Export

Deregulationand the Illicit Trade in Archaeological Material, in LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
ON CULTURAL RESOURCES 88-92 (Jennifer M. Richman & Marion P. Forsyth eds.,
2004).
See generally ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES:
16.
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES AND PLACES (2001) (evaluating the drug problem
and possible solutions in the United States and comparing that with the problems and
remedial attempts in different countries); THE TRADE IN WILDLIFE: REGULATION FOR
CONSERVATION (Sara Oldfield ed., 2003) (comprising essays examining the regulation
and enforcement of international trade in wildlife and the global disparities).
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trades together as a single generic category. The trade in antiquities,
and in cultural material more generally, has its own sociocultural
characteristics. Thus, it is distinguishable from other illegal trades
and the value of comparative perspectives is diminished.
Two empirical studies of the trade in cultural material have
shown that strong export controls work. Between 1820 and 1870,
pre-unification Italian states with strong export controls in place
retained more of their cultural heritage (measured in terms of
17
paintings and antique books) than states with weak or no controls.
Thefts from cultural institutions in the Czech Republic rose sharply
after 1989, the year the "Iron Curtain" was raised; though this
example also highlights the curtailment of civil liberties that might
be necessary for strong export controls to work and that are probably
unacceptable in a liberal society. ' 8
This Article offers a further, admittedly partisan, contribution to
the debate over the effectiveness of statutory regulation, especially at
source, of the antiquities trade by introducing historical and social
perspectives. First, this Article describes the history and assesses the
utility of regulation in two countries, Greece and India. Second, this
Article incorporates insights drawn from the examples of Greece and
India into a discussion of the wider social and cultural contexts of the
collection and trade of antiquities.

II. REGULATION AT THE SOURCE OF THE ARTIFACT

The objective of any strategy aimed at combating the illegal
trade in antiquities is twofold: to take the trade out of the hands of
criminals while, at the same time, protecting the archaeological
resource. Clearly, the trade could easily be saved from criminals by
relaxing regulation, but only at an undetermined cost to the
archaeological resource. Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to
how this cost might be measured. 19 Successful protection of the
archaeological resource might be differently conceived, either as
conserving the integrity of archaeological sites and monuments, or as
defending property rights. From the archaeological perspective of
this Article the former concept is preferred, although national laws
may enshrine an uneasy compromise between both concepts.
The archaeological laws of most so-called "source countries" have
a long history that often predates the modern nation state. In Italy,

17.

Guido Guerzoni, Cultural Heritage and PreservationPolicies: Notes on the

History of the Italian Case, in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON CULTURAL HERITAGE 107,

118-21 (Michael Hutter & Ilde Rizzo eds., 1997).
18.
See Pavel Jirdsek, Situation in the Czech Republic, in ONE HUNDRED
MISSING OBJECTS: LOOTING IN EUROPE 35-39 (ICOM ed. 2000).

19.

See 3 PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 3, at 17-25.
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for example, laws enacted before nineteenth century unification
continue to exert an influence over present legislation. 20 In many
states, including India, laws were first enacted by colonial
administrations. 21 Thus, modern archaeological laws often have a
long pedigree and have been amended and adapted to changing
political and economic circumstances. One legacy of this historical
development is that rules are not always unequivocal, and laws might
embody accommodations or compromises that have been made
between different social interests or intellectual agendas. This legal
indeterminacy has sometimes caused difficulties for U.S. courts called
upon to enforce foreign archaeological laws. 22 Nevertheless, most
source countries have adopted laws that prohibit the export of
archaeological objects and take archaeological heritage into state
ownership. As noted earlier, Bator has suggested that these laws
have been ineffective. 23 If Bator is right, then before abandoning
these laws, it will be useful to examine in detail several specific
examples of apparent failures, in order to identify the causes of
failure and suggest possible remedies.
With this strategy in mind, this Article presents two case
studies. The first concerns the plundering of Bronze-Age Cycladic
cemeteries in Greece between the 1950s and 1970s. The second looks
at the situation in India over the same time period. These two
countries offer a useful contrast because, during the time in question,
the archaeological law of Greece took, in Merryman's terms, a '' more
"nationalist" approach, while India's was more "internationalist. 24
For Merryman, a culturally-nationalist regime is retentionist
and potentially destructive if sufficient resources are not available
within the host country to support the proper care of retained objects
or of archaeological sites and monuments. 25 A culturallyinternationalist regime offers protection to materials as the free trade
of objects draws them inevitably towards those countries with the
means to conserve them. 2 6 As will become clear, however, these
27
characterizations are probably overdrawn.

Guerzoni, supra note 17, at 121-24.
20.
See infra, note 67.
21.
See e.g., United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 997-1000 (5th Cir. 1977)
22.
(noting that while "Mexican law has been concerned with the preservation and
regulation of pre-Columbian artifacts since 1897," Mexican ownership of preColumbian artifacts was declared gradually, and not "unequivocally" until 1972).
23.
BATOR, supra note 14, at 41-43.
John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM.
24.
J. INT'L L. 831, 846 (1986).

Id. at 846, 852-53.
25.
26.
Id. at 846-47.
Merryman draws his distinction from readings of the 1954 Hague
27.
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
which he claims recognizes the existence of a common (universal) interest in some
manifestations of cultural heritage, and from readings of the 1970 UNESCO
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A. Example 1: The Greek Cycladic Islands
Cycladic figurines-manufactured on some of the Greek Cycladic
islands during the third millennium B.C. (early Bronze Age)-are
small, bleached-white marble figures varying in height from 0.15 to
1.5 meters (with most falling in the lower end of the range). When
they first came to public attention in the nineteenth century, the
figurines were considered ugly and barbaric but, by the middle years
of the twentieth century, their simplicity of form and color had raised
their status to harbingers of Modernist sculpture. 28 During the 1950s
and 1960s large numbers of these figurines began to appear on the
international market where they commanded high prices and were
acquired by museums and collections around the world. 29 Today,
there are thought to be 1,600 in existence, though the large majority
were not known before the 1960s and do not have a provenance that
can be traced back to an archaeological site. 30 An unknown
percentage of the figurines are almost certainly fakes. 31 Most genuine
figurines acquired on the market were looted from early Bronze Age
Cycladic cemeteries-a trend that became endemic in the 1950s and
did not diminish until the 1970s. 32 It is believed that, during this
time, hundreds of cemeteries were destroyed, 33 perhaps 10,000 or
34
12,000 graves in all.
Greek antiquities have been looted since Greece was an Ottoman
province, and statutory protection of archaeological heritage in

Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, which he claims recognizes instead the
concept of individual national heritages. Id. Roger O'Keefe offers an alternative
perspective when he argues that the idea of a common cultural heritage is flawed and
has been superseded in international law by the UNESCO Convention's more
sophisticated concept of cultural diversity. See Roger O'Keefe, The Meaning of
"Cultural Property" Under the 1954 Hague Convention, 56 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 26-56

(1999).
28.

David W.J. Gill & Christopher Chippindale, Material and Intellectual

Consequences of Esteem For Cycladic Figures,97 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 601, 605 (1993).

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 605-08.
Id. at 608-16.
See id. at 616-21; John Craxton & Peter Warren, A Neocycladic Harpist?,

in MATERIAL ENGAGEMENTS: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF COLIN RENFREW, 109-13 (Neil

Brodie & Catherine Hills eds., 2004); Ricardo J. Elia, A Seductive and Troubling Work,
in ARCHAEOLOGICAL ETHICS 54, 56-59 (Karen D. Vitelli ed., 1996).

32.
Marisa Marthari, Altering Information from the Past: Illegal Excavations in
Greece and the Case of the Early Bronze Age Cyclades, in TRADE IN ILLICIT
ANTIQUITIES: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 161, 165

(Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2001).
Gill & Chippindale, supra note 28, at 610 (citing Christos Doumas, who at
33.
the time was working for the Greek Archaeological Service in the islands).
34.
See Gill & Chippindale, supra note 28, at 625.
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independent Greece dates back to 1834, at the latest. 35 By the 1950s,
when large scale looting first broke out in the Cyclades, the governing
law was Law 5351/32 "On Antiquities," enacted in 1932.36 This law
established that all antiquities were state property, but that they
could be possessed and transacted within Greece by private
individuals. 37 Any found antiquity had to be declared, whereupon the
State might have offered to purchase it, although if it was thought to
be of little commercial or archaeological value it would be left in the
possession of the finder with the proviso that any subsequent sale or
change of ownership be declared. 38 It was recognized at the time that
the most likely finders of material-rural inhabitants-might be
ignorant of their rights under the law, and would thus be fearful of
contact with government authorities. There was also concern that
39
Both
payment for finds might be subject to bureaucratic delays.
circumstances would encourage the emergence of a black market.
Thus, the 1932 law also provided for the private collection and sale of
40
antiquities within Greece, though export was still prohibited.
Collectors and dealers were licensed, yet their numbers were, and
still are, limited. 41 In 2000, for example, there were only thirty-six
licensed private collectors and sixteen dealers, most of whom were
42
concentrated in Athens.
Thus the 1932 law introduced a sophisticated strategy aimed at
protecting archaeological heritage. First, it prohibited the export of
antiquities in order to isolate Greece from the strong financial
attraction and inflating effect of the international antiquities market.
Second, it created an internal market to protect chance finds and
present a legitimate alternative to illegal export. Finally, it guarded
against any dangerous expansion of the internal market by taking
steps to regulate its size. In 1932 this law promised to work well.
Chance finds would be cared for and, since there would be no real
incentive to dig up antiquities for sale, the integrity of archaeological
sites would be protected too. Unfortunately, the 1932 law proved
incapable of dealing with the changing world of the 1950s when
increasing numbers of new archaeological sites were discovered and

Pantos A. Pantos, Greece and Greek Legislation about Antiquities, in
35.
CULTURAL PROPERTY: RETURN AND ILLICIT TRADE 17-19 (Katerina Kostandi et al. eds.,
2000).
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
40.
Id.
Id.
41.
Rhodoniki Etzeoglou, The Ephorate of Antique Shops and Private
42.
Archaeological Collections, in CULTURAL PROPERTY: RETURN AND ILLICIT TRADE 39-40

(Katerina Kostandi et al. eds., 2000).
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the expanding international art market caused the demand for
43
antiquities to escalate.
In the 1950s, Greece was a poor country and in no position to
match the prices that Cycladic figurines fetched on the international
market. 44 In response to the plunder of Cycladic cemeteries, the
Greek government encouraged Nicholas and Dolly Goulandris, two
private citizens, to form a private collection of Cycladic antiquities
(particularly figurines) with the intention of keeping plundered
material in Greece. 45 The Goulandris collection was established in
1961 and exhibited worldwide between 1979 and 1984.46 In 1986, it
was permanently housed in the private Museum of Cycladic Art in
47
Athens, where it remains open to public view.
The Goulandris collection acquired, and still acquires, material
from dealers within Greece and on the international antiquities
market, none of which is derived from officially sanctioned
archaeological excavations. 48 The collection has succeeded on one
level, in that it has retained many figurines in Greece that would
otherwise have gone abroad. The collection, however, has been
heavily criticized for its governing policy of buying material inside
49
Greece and its failure to restrict buying to the international market.
The acquisitions policy of the Goulandris collection circumvented the
need for looted material to be smuggled out of the country. As a
consequence of the Goulandris' acquisition policy, looted material
could now be sold locally and legally; thus, the deterrent effect of
export control was seriously compromised and the effect of looting
50
was exacerbated.
Today, the early-Bronze-Age cemeteries of the Cycladic islands
are devastated. 5 1 Most Cycladic graves never contained figurines yet
they were destroyed by the search for them. 52 Rescue excavations at
several sites by the Greek Archaeological Service 53 have investigated
intact graves, but they are a small proportion of the original total. 54
Mainstream archaeology has illuminated many aspects of Cycladic

43.
44.
45.

Pantos, supra note 35, at 23-25.
Id.; Elia, supra note 31, at 54-62.
Elia, supra note 31, at 54-62.

46.
47.

Id.
See generally CHRISTOS G. DOUMAS, EARLY CYCLADIC CULTURE: THE N.P.

GOULANDRIS COLLECTION (2000) (cataloguing the collection); Museum of Cycladic Art,
http://www.cycladic-m.gr/index.htm.
48
Elia, supra note 31, at 54-62.
49.
Id.
The activities of the Nicholas P. Goulandris Foundation, which
supports the Museum of Cycladic Art, extend beyond those of acquisition and display,
as some of its critics suggest, and it has supported several large exhibitions. Id.
50.
Gill and Chippindale, supra note 28, at 625.
51.
Id.
52.
Elia, supra note 31, at 58.
53.
The state-run archaeological service of Greece.
54.
Gill and Chippindale, supra note 28, at 625.
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settlement and society, but out of context, the figurines have been
marginalized as enigmatic
though contro'versial
curiosities.
Consequently, the chance to learn more about Cycladic belief systems
has been lost. 55 It is difficult to assess the scale of present day looting
in the Cyclades, but members of the Greek Archaeological Service
56
who work on the various islands think that it is now much reduced.
One reason for this reduction might simply be that the resource-the
early-Bronze Age cemeteries-is exhausted. Another reason must be
that the economic position of the islands has improved from the
growth of tourism and from Greece's membership of the European
Union. 57 This economic improvement has probably been the crucial
factor influencing the fall-off in looting, but it does not exclude the
possibility that strong regulation may also have played a part. If
regulation is relaxed, there is no guarantee that widespread looting
will not resume.
B. Example 2. India
Archaeological law in India in the 1950s dated back to colonial
times and was based on British precepts of selective protection and
equitable division of finds. 58 The 1878 Treasure Trove Act, still in
force today, requires that any object or group of objects of value found
in the ground be reported to the responsible government agent. 5 9 If
no owner is traced, the find, or the value of the find, is divided
between the finder and the landowner. 60 The government has the
right to acquire the find by payment of its market value, plus twenty
percent. 61 The 1904 Ancient Monuments Preservation Act allowed for
the protection of specified archaeological sites and monuments and,
after independence in 1947, it was superseded by the 1958 Ancient
Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act. 6 2 This Act
afforded protection to archaeological sites and monuments designated
to be of national importance, and was intended to complement the

55.
Id.
56.
Author's Conversations with Staff of the Greek Archaeological Service.
57.
See id. The growth of tourism has encouraged a long term program of
museum building and refurbishment in the Cycladic Islands, but many of the best
quality early Bronze Age finds can only be viewed in Athens at the Museum of Cycladic
Art. Id. How this increasingly visible and perhaps economically damaging loss of
archaeological heritage affects the islanders' perceptions of past and present looting
would be interesting to know.
58.
SACHINDRA SEKHAR BISWAS, PROTECTING THE CULTURAL
NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 3 (1999).

59.
60.

Id.
Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 34-49.
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pre-independence 1947 Antiquities Act (Export Control Act), which
63
allowed the licensed export of any antiquity that was not protected.
Although there had been some international demand for Indian
(and other South Asian) religious statuary and sculpture in the
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, it was not highly regarded.
Consequently, the damage caused to archaeological sites and
monuments by the illegal removal of such works was limited. 64 By the
mid-twentieth century, however, art historians had convinced
Western collectors of its aesthetic merit. By the 1950s and 1960s,
alarming quantities of Indian antiquities were flowing out of the
country, much of it into U.S. art museums.65 The existing legal
regime in India protected only a small number of total archaeological
sites and allowed the licensed export of antiquities; it was clearly
unable to deal with scale of the problem. The seriousness of the
situation prompted the Indian government to introduce the more
stringent 1972 Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, which was
implemented in 1976.66 This Act strictly prohibited the export of
archaeological objects and took steps to regulate the private
ownership and sale of antiquities within India. It stopped short,
67
however, of taking all archaeological heritage into state ownership.
Article 3 of the 1972 Antiquities and Art Treasures Act does allow for
the legal export of antiquities through a government-authorized
68
agency, but no such agency has ever been established.
Thus, in India, the originally internationalist regime based on
the British model of protecting significant archaeological sites and
individual pieces (though allowing export of the rest) had two major
shortcomings: (1) it failed to ameliorate the international demand for
Indian antiquities and (2) it failed to stem the large-scale trade in
Indian antiquities that developed in the 1950s and the destruction of
sites and monuments that followed. The Indian response was to
tighten control. 69 It is unclear how much of the material that reached
the international market during this period was licensed for export
and how much was removed illegally. But several pieces have been
returned to India from private collections or museums, usually

63.

Id. at 29-31.

64.
See H. BHISHAM PAL, THE PLUNDER OF ART 28-49 (1992); U.N. SOC. DEF.
RES. INST. (UNSDRI), THE PROTECTION OF THE ARTISTIC AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL
HERITAGE: A VIEW FROM ITALY AND INDIA 191-259 (1976) (showing statistically the

growing export of art from India).
65.
Neil Brodie & Jenny Doole, The Asian Art Affair: US Art Museum
Collections of Asian Art and Archaeology, in MATERIAL ENGAGEMENTS, supra note 39,
at 83-108.
66.
See PAL, supra note 64, at 78-103.
67.
UNSDRI, supra note 64, at 226-28.
68.
DILIP K. CHAKRABARTI, ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE THIRD WORLD: A HISTORY OF
INDIAN ARCHAEOLOGY SINCE 1947, at 171 (2003).

69.

See PAL, supra note 64, at 78-103.
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voluntarily, when they have been identified as stolen from religious
institutions.70
One high profile court case concerning a bronze Nataraja
removed during this period is quite revealing. 71 In 1951, a group of
bronze images was discovered at Sivapuram (Tamil Nadu) and
declared treasure trove. 72 The images were acquired by the Indian
government and then donated to the local Hindu temple. 7 3 A
Nataraja from the hoard was stolen in 1957 while it was away from
the temple being repaired. 74 It was smuggled out of India in 1969 and
by 1973 was in the hands of the American private collector Norton
Simon. 75 Its entry into the United States was facilitated by the
production of a false export certificate at customs. 76 In 1974, It was
sent to the United Kingdom for repairs, where at the request of the
Indian authorities, it was seized by Scotland Yard. 77 In 1976, after
initial litigation, the parties reached an out-of-court settlement,
which recognized the government of Tamil Nadu as the rightful
78
owner but allowed Simon to retain possession for a ten year period.
79
The image was returned to India in 1986.
The Nataraja was shown to be stolen property, and it seems
likely that, given the religious character of most Indian antiquities
that appear on the market, they too would have been stolen from
temple collections or even from the actual structure of temples.
Presumably, this type of material was not being released on to the
market legally, and the lesser material that was available for export
was not in demand. Thus, this Indian case study confounds the logic
that underpins the argument for weak regulation: the legal export of
poor quality pieces cannot satisfy a demand for high quality ones.

70.

Ajai

Shankar,

The Threat to Cultural Sites in India from

Illegal

Excavation, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES, supra note 32, at 33-35.

71.
Id.
Natarajas were first manufactured in tenth to thirteenth century
Chola-period south India and comprise a three-dimensional image of the Hindu god
Shiva in a dancing pose set within the confines of an encompassing bronze circle or
halo. Id.
72.

Id. at 34.

73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id.

76.

3 PROTT & OKEEFE, at 665.

77.
78.

Shankar, supra note 70, at 34.
Id.

79.

B.P. SINGH, INDIA'S CULTURE: THE STATE, THE ARTS AND BEYOND 178-84

(1998).
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III. DISCUSSION
The Indian and Greek archaeological laws in place in the 1950s
both attempted to balance public and private interests in
archaeological heritage. In international terms, since it allowed for
the legal export of archaeological objects, India's law can be viewed as
more liberal than the Greek law. Both countries, however, failed to
prevent the extensive destruction or vandalism of their archaeological
80
or cultural sites and the flow abroad of archaeological material. The
simple reason was that the inflating international art market caused
such a price differential between the rich "demand" countries and the
poorer source countries that smuggling became worthwhile. The
profits to be made outweighed the chances of being caught, and were
such that smugglers could easily absorb the added costs of law
avoidance. The internationalist regime of India could no more
assuage demand than the nationalist regime of Greece could deny it.
The objects reaching the market were not chance finds. The
Cycladic figurines had been dug out of graves, 8 ' and the Indian
Natarajas and other religious images and sculpture were often stolen
private property.8 2 The release of surplus or duplicate material onto
the market would not have helped in either case because the trade
was driven by demand for what were considered high-quality pieces.
The consumers wanted Cycladic figurines and Indian Natarajas or
the like, and there were no available "duplicates" or acceptable
substitutes that would have satisfied them. Indeed, it seems
inevitable that while antiquities are collected as "art," the demand for
the exceptional piece--for the "masterpiece"-will persist. It is a fact
recognized and even approved by the Association of Art Museum
Directors' 2004 guidelines for the acquisition of antiquities that
some works of art for which provenance information is incomplete or
unobtainable may deserve to be publicly displayed, preserved, studied,
and published because of their rarity, importance, and aesthetic merit.
AAMD affirms that art museums have an obligation with respect to
such works of art, which in the absence of any breach of law ... may in
some cases be acquired .... 83

(For the AAMD, in this context, a work of art is an antiquity). In view
of this philosophy, it seems naive to suggest that a regulation
allowing a freer flow of what dealers call "less important material"
would satisfy demand and, thus, ameliorate looting at source. The
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See PAL, supra note 64, at 97.
Gill & Chippindale, supra note 28, at 610.
See Shankar, supra note 70, at 34-35; UNSDRI, supra note 64, at 216-17.
Association of Art Museum Directors, Report of the AAMD Task Force on
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available at http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/JunelOFinalTaskForceReport_001.pdf.
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examples of Greece and India show that there would most likely still
be a large demand for rare, or what are perceived to be, high-quality
objects of a type that would not be released onto the market under
any regime, and that the destruction of archaeological heritage would
continue.
Looking more closely at what happened in Greece and India, it
might be suggested that the provisions made to balance public and
private interests ultimately weakened both sets of laws. They were
both designed for a world with an extant but not overly large
antiquities market. When that market expanded, both in terms of
monetary value and material volume, the Greek internal market
expanded along with it. Instead of competing with international
demand, it acted to augment it.8 4 The example of the Sivapuram
Nataraja shows that before 1976 the possibility of legal export from
India prompted the manufacture of fake licenses that could ease the
passage of stolen and smuggled material through customs controls
and into collections. Another ruse was to substitute high quality
unlicensed objects for poor quality licensed objects.8 5 Simpler laws
offering more state control may well have better served the
archaeology of both countries. In fact, Indian legislators took that
approach in 1972 when they moved from a regime of export screening
to one of total prohibition.8 6 There is no published data available to
show whether the 1972 Indian law did anything to diminish the flow
87
of antiquities abroad (and the thefts certainly did continue),
although it did discourage at least one U.S. museum from acquiring
88
them.
Simpler laws may also facilitate their enforcement by foreign
courts. The conviction in 2002 of New York antiquities dealer
Frederick Schultz for dealing in antiquities stolen from Egypt
confirmed that U.S. courts are prepared to enforce foreign patrimony
laws.8 9 This fact should deter the purchase or other acquisition of
antiquities that are public property. But the law has to be clear, and
it has to be clearly enforced. 90 In 1989, Peru filed a lawsuit to recover
what it claimed were stolen state-owned pre-Columbian artifacts.
The suit failed because although Peru had first enacted a patrimony
law in 1929, private possession and transaction of artifacts were
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See UNSDRI, supra note 64, at 224.
Id.
Id. at 228; BISWAS, supra note 58, at 80-97.

87.
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88.
Brodie & Doole, supra note 65, at 97.
89.
U.S. v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445, 446-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[Platrimony
consists of all works of art within the borders of a country (and perhaps some outside)
that are subject to that country's power of jurisdiction.").
90.
See id. at 447.
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91
tolerated within the countryas long as they were not exported. In
fact, the patrimony law had the material92effect of an export control,
which the U.S. court would not recognize.
India's 1972 law is not a patrimony law. It remains to be
established whether the most recent Greek law-3038/2002, "On the
93
Protection of Antiquities and of the Cultural Heritage in General"which still provides for some private possession and transaction,
would be recognized as a patrimony law by a U.S. court. 94 Both
countries might be well-advised to enact clearly defined
archaeological patrimony laws and look to U.S. courts to enforce
them.
With this eventuality in mind, it is arguably against the U.S.
taxpayers' interest to pay for the enforcement of foreign patrimony
laws. On the other hand, while it might not be in their interest, they
may feel morally obliged to contribute something since they benefit
culturally and economically from the antiquities trade while suffering
few of its adverse consequences. The trade provides U.S. art
museums with material for display and public enjoyment.
Furthermore, the trade generates fiscal revenue for U.S. state and
federal authorities, directly, through sales and, indirectly, through
95
In
increased employment in the museums and market sectors.
contrast, countries with strong laws protecting archaeological
heritage are generally those that incur the social, cultural and
economic costs of the trade; these include the loss or destruction of
cultural heritage, the diminution of a long-term economic resource,
and the socially harmful consequences of crime. 96 These source
countries are also the ones that can least afford to enforce their own
legislation. 97 This inequitable division of costs and benefits could be
remedied in part by shifting the cost of law enforcement off the
already overloaded shoulders of poor governments and onto those of
the U.S. taxpayers, who are, after all, the trade's beneficiaries.
Although the two examples of the Cycladic Islands and post-1976
India show that strong export controls did not prevent the destructive
looting of archaeological sites, the example of pre-1976 India shows

91.
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Id. at 171.
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See Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (enforcing Egyptian antiquities law for
94.
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See id. at 391.
96.
See id. at 399.
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that a weak export control did nothing to prevent the looting either. 98
Yet while the evidence suggests that strong export controls were not
completely effective, it does not show that they were completely
ineffective. 99 Even though strong regulation might not have a direct
material effect, it will exert a moral effect.
Bator's judgment that strong export controls will fail was based
upon the self-confessed "pessimistic premise" that "so long as there is
a world market for beautiful archaeological objects, a substantial
amount of looting will persist no matter what regulatory system is
installed."'10 0 The examples of Greece and India discussed here would
appear to prove his point. 01' But the world market for beautiful
archaeological objects is not a natural or inevitable phenomenon; it is
historically and culturally contingent and thus open to methods of
10 2
control that depend more upon persuasion than direct regulation.
In this context, even what is an unenforceable legal control at the
source, nevertheless places a moral restraint upon the trade.
Antiquities in the developed world are cultural capital: they are
objects of scholarship and signifiers of taste and style. One compelling
reason for the retention of strong regulation at the source, even if
poorly enforced, is that law-abiding citizens and museums will think
twice before acquiring an object of possibly illegal origin. 10 3 If strong
regulation is relaxed or abandoned, the moral restraint is removed.
Collecting antiquities is not addictive, at least not in the way that
drugs are, and good faith collectors will not want to be associated
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See PAL, supranote 64, at 97.
See Brodie, supra note 15, at 92-93 (explaining how the International
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BATOR, supra note 14, at 49.
Gill and Chippindale, supra note 28, at 610-11; Shankar, supra note 70, at
BRODIE ET AL., supra note 1,at 482; see Christine Alder & Kenneth Polk,

Stopping this Awful Business: The Illicit Traffic in Antiquities Examined as a Criminal
Market, 7 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 46 (2002) (detailing a criminological perspective on
"moral persuasion" and the antiquities trade).
103.
International Council of Museums, 2004 Code of Ethics for Museums,
available at http://icom.museum/ethics.html. The effect of this moral injunction can
most clearly be seen in Art. 2.3 of the 2004 Code of Ethics for Museums, which states
that
[e]very effort must be made before acquisition to ensure that any object or
specimen offered for purchase, gift, loan, bequest, or exchange has not been
illegally obtained in or exported from, its country of origin or any intermediate
country in which it might have been owned legally (including the museum's
own country). Due diligence in this regard should establish the full history of
the item from discovery or production.
Id.
The International Council of Museums is a nongovernmental organization
maintaining formal relations with UNESCO, and has 21,000 individual and
institutional members in 146 countries. Id.
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with a criminal enterprise. At least some will collect only antiquities
that can be shown to have a legal provenance; others might choose to
collect something of a less controversial nature.

